John's College, Oxford, as an Open Exhibitioner in the Michaelmas Term 1929. He gradu ated in natural science (chemistry) in 1933 (B.A. 1932 ) with first class honours -one of many who was fortunate in having H.W. (later Sir Harold) 'Tommy' Thompson as one of his tutors. Interestingly, although entitled to do so, he did not present himself for the conferment of B.Sc. and M.A. until 1959 ; perhaps an early example of his urge for the next challenge. He enjoyed tennis, but his main pastime was rowing in which the St John's boat had some success. He also had an interest in archaeology but his practical involvement in digging soon came to an end when he left Oxford.
In 1936 he married Agnes Kathleen (Kay) Brander, the daughter of a local schoolmaster who, after taking an honours degree in French at Bedford College, taught at Morecambe Grammar School. They first met, when they were both at school, through a common interest in tennis. They had two sons and two daughters.
The ICI years Kearton joined ICI at Billingham in 1933 on leaving Oxford. He was recruited by M.P. Appleby, Head of Research in the Synthetic Ammonia Division of the company at Billingham, who until the previous year had himself been a Fellow of St John's. On his second day he started at 6 a.m. on shifts working a 56-hour week. He soon rose through the ranks to shift manager and later became a refinery manager. He worked on the production of wo-octane in the hydrogenation plants at Billingham, and later, at Heysham. Subsequently he was one of the seven founder members of a department created to carry out chemical engi neering research -one of the first in the country. Working with engineers and chemical engi neers Kearton began to acquire the familiarity with these disciplines which he used to such good effect later in his work on atomic energy, in Courtaulds, and in so many other fields, but especially in forming and running the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC).
Many years later, at BNOC, there was an echo of this time. During one of the many diffi cult discussions with oil company executives -who were suspicious of, and in some cases hostile to, the formation of BNOC -he was subjected to a patronizing lecture on the different characteristics of the separate fractions from the cracking of oil. Kearton listened politely and then took up the discussion and extended it into some of the more sophisticated aspects of oil chemistry. His views were thereafter listened to with more attention.
Some of his colleagues from those years recall a man who was 'inordinately ambitious', and who had 'one of the most lively and quick thinking minds which, coupled with a hasty temper, made him an awkward colleague' -but one whose achievements they much admired.
In 1941 Kearton was chosen to join a team working on the Tube Alloys project. He returned to ICI for a time in 1943 to take part in the design of a plant urgently needed for very high octane fuel to counteract the threat from flying bombs. Thereafter he re-joined the atomic bomb project. When the war ended he was seconded from ICI to work in Turkey for the British Government advising on a project for the manufacture of fertilizers. When this did not proceed he returned to Billingham. In the short time before he left ICI to join Courtaulds in July 1946, he was responsible for pilot plants producing small commercial quantities of some 40 special organic chemicals -a period well remembered by some of those who worked with him for the intense objectional smell of some of the amines produced.
T u b e a llo y s a n d th e M anhattan P r o jec t In spite of the impetus given to the exploration of nuclear warfare devices which followed confirmation of nuclear fission in 1939 British official scientific opinion remained sceptical and work proceeded with little urgency. All this changed when the classic memorandum of March 1940 by R.E. (later Sir Rudolf) Peierls and O.R. Frisch was brought to the attention of the Government by M.L.E. Oliphant. They propounded the case for a bomb using only a modest amount, perhaps as little as 5 kg of uranium 235; suggested the use of thermal diffu sion of uranium hexafluoride to separate 235U from 238U; and outlined the principle that might be adopted to construct the device. Its impact was immediate and far reaching. The MAUD Committee, set up within a month with G.P. Thomson as its Chairman, initiated work at a number of universities. Following its second meeting the Committee asked for help from ICI, recognizing that only ICI had the industrial resources that would be required.
The MAUD Committee Report of July 1941 concluded that an effective bomb was capable of being produced and led to the establishment of the Directorate of Tube Alloys under Sir John Anderson, with Mr (later Sir) Wallace Akers, Head of Research in ICI, as working head of the project. The spread of scientific talent working on the project was formi dable, but in the middle of 1941 Akers decided that a technological team drawn from those working on uranium at Billingham was needed to back up this scientific effort.
Kearton was one of those chosen to join this team. He was employed mainly on liaison with the scientists, and as co-ordinator of much of the work within ICI especially on uranium hexafluoride diffusion. His pre-war experience in translating research into production, and marrying his own chemical skills with the engineering and flowsheeting expertise of others, stood him in good stead. He soon became responsible for the experimental station at Valley in North Wales. In spite of the near total breakdown of collaboration with the U.S.A. in 1942, much progress was made in establishing the design features for a full-scale diffusion plant.
Following the Quebec Agreement in August 1943, and the re-establishment of some lim ited collaboration, it became clear that the massive American effort had achieved a substan tial lead over progress in Britain. While recognizing that to do so would materially slow down work in Britain, it was decided to support the American effort both by the transfer of scientists and engineers to the Manhattan Project, and by sharing information on the result of the work done in Britain.
Among those seconded to the Manhattan Project was a group that worked with the Kellex Corporation of New York responsible for the diffusion plant at Oak Ridge. The Manhattan Project had asked for this team because they were impressed by the progress made in Britain on fabricating membranes and also by features of the British cascade design. Members of the group, led by Peierls, that went to the U.S.A. in December 1943 included Kearton (and also Fuchs). The group was based in the offices of the British Supply Mission in Wall Street, New York. Kearton's function was to be responsible for liaison, to transmit relevant U.K. knowledge to the Americans, and to transfer requests for work to such teams as were still active in the U.K. A senior colleague recalls that Kearton's ability to go to the heart of a problem and to summarize its essential features was a great asset and helped to bring about fruitful collaboration in what were difficult circumstances. Kearton returned to Britain at the end of January 1944 via Montreal where he and his colleagues held discussions with the team working on the first heavy water reactor.
He made a further visit to the U.S.A. from March 1944 until September of that year. He was responsible for technical liaison with the Manhattan Project on gaseous diffusion. In addition to his own contribution he was charged with reporting back to the U.K. The work he did is contained in some 132 formal reports to the DSIR and in many letters to individuals in the U.K. In these letters he kept in close personal touch with many of the key scientistsNicholas Kurti, Francis Simon, and others -and also with members of the original ICI team including James Park and Michael Perrin; a pattern of direct personal contact at all levels which was to be repeated throughout his life. He was extremely active, making numerous visits to the many contractors -Kellex Corporation, Union Carbide, Allis Chalmers, the uni versity departments at Columbia, Princeton and others, the Bell Telephone Laboratories and, of course, Oak Ridge.
There is no doubt that Kearton's stint in 1944 was a great success. Many accounts testify that he was welcome not only for his own expertise but also for his abundant energy, appetite for work and his 'friendly and open personality'. The work that he did, and the reports that he sent back, are still classified. Moreover, he left the U.S.A. before the diffusion plant at Oak Ridge went into production. Nevertheless he must have returned with a considerable amount of information and with an understanding of the major problems. This enabled him to make an important contribution to the British effort which had been renewed in May 1944 when consideration was being given to the British post-war nuclear effort.
Kearton came back from his time in the U.S.A. with two other pieces of experience that he was later to put to good use. He saw what could be done when a country harnesses its total resources to a particular end. The size of the Manhattan Project and what it was able to achieve, both intellectually and physically, in such a short time is even today difficult to appreciate. He also saw how, by drive and dedication, it was possible to build manufacturing plants in a fraction of the time that was commonly accepted as normal in Britain.
His time in the U.S.A. also led to two regrets. He, in common with many others working on the bomb, believed that it would not be used in action. He was deeply disappointed when it was used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During his time as a member of the British teams he became a close associate of Klaus Fuchs. Kearton admired him as a scientist and respected him as a person. Some 30 years later he was prompted to recall his friendship; he said that he trusted Fuchs totally. When Fuchs returned to Britain after the war and worked at Harwell, Kearton and others befriended him. Fuchs became a frequent visitor at the Kearton home. It became a family joke that Fuchs was undernourished and he was plied with food; Kay Kearton's mother pressed her sweet ration on him. When suspicion fell on Fuchs in 1949 it also fell on Kearton -they alone had seen the papers that had been leaked -who later described the ensuing period as 'the worst time in my life'. The disappointment of his mis judgement stayed with him for the rest of his life.
C ourtaulds Kearton joined Courtaulds in 1946. After the excitement of the war years he found life in ICI lacking in challenge. Prompted by a paper given by A.H. (later Sir Alan) Wilson, who had become a Director of Courtaulds in 1945, in which he outlined some of the plans for reconstruction and capital spending, Kearton wrote to him. They had met when working for the Manhattan Project and in his letter Kearton said 'as you know I am good at spending money'.
Courtaulds had emerged from the war shorn of its American business, which in the 1930s had provided dividends which alone contributed more than the trading profits from all the other activities of the Group. With a need to modernize ageing factories and to expand capacity the Board, especially its newer members, notably Wilson and Sir Wilfred Freeman, recognized that the company was short of young men of talent. Moreover there were serious tensions on the Board, and within the body of senior executives. These have been described and analysed at length by D.C. Coleman. The root of the problems laid in the long standing division and outlook between the so-called 'Coventry' Directors and their staffs, and the 'London' Directors. The 'Coventry Directors', with practical backgrounds, had limited hori zons, and were steeped in traditional hierarchical attitudes. The 'London Directors', led by the Chairman, Sir John Hanbury-Williams, maintained a lofty ignorance of the practical details of the business (he often referred to 'the Mill Directors'). They spent much time and effort seeking to re-create the former prestige of the company, by exploring overseas invest ments including re-establishment of a presence in North America, and by seeking honorific appointments. This was the company that Kearton joined.
His 29 years with Courtaulds can conveniently be viewed in three periods; 1946-1952, when he was appointed to the Board; 1952 -1962 , after the failure of the ICI bid ; and 1962 and -1975 and (he became Chairman in 1964 .
In these 29 years he made his mark in many ways. Above all, he emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as the principal driving force in developing and implementing a strategy for growth that, in two decades, transformed the company. That strategy had several strands that evolved over time. Any description of Kearton's life and work would be incomplete without an account of some of those strands.
1946-1952
Kearton was appointed in 1946 to form and head a Chemical Engineering Section (CES) within the research department. He set about this with customary gusto, recruiting experi enced chemical engineers, with a sprinkling of chemists and engineers, some from those released from war assignments, some from other companies, including several from ICI. To this nucleus was soon added a stream of new graduates, selected against stringent academic and personality criteria. CES, closely directed by Kearton, investigated the expansion and strengthening of Courtaulds' chemical base in its cellulose acetate business, where it was almost wholly dependent upon outside suppliers, in contrast to its larger competitor in this field, British Celanese. In its main business, viscose, it had begun manufacture in 1917 of two of the three principal raw materials, sulphuric acid and carbon disulphide. More modern and efficient processes were now available and in spite of resistance from the entrenched managements, these too were investigated. Before long, CES, which did not confine itself to purely tech nical issues but also embraced economic, production and marketing questions, was engaged in studies of modernization and expansion of most of the company's operations; and in exploring new ventures. Many years later, in one of the few papers that he wrote, he set out his views on the part which a chemical engineer can play in industry. The role it depicts is comprehensive and influential.
Before long CES had become the base of knowledge, of expertise and, ultimately, of power, from which Kearton exercised influence throughout an increasingly large part of the company. He soon became responsible too for the research laboratory working on cellulose acetate and related matters, and used its resource for the work on synthetic fibres and on cel lulose dissolving pulp. Two projects illustrate Kearton's contribution.
When it was decided in 1951 (more to assuage wounded pride than for purely business considerations) to build a new viscose staple fibre factory in the U.S.A. CES was involved in flowsheeting the plant. Kearton quickly extended the remit to embrace the overall design. He insisted that the plant should embody state of the art technology. This meant, much to the chagrin of the established management, using designs and ideas developed by others in the industry as well as some major new unit processes developed by CES. Engineering Headquarters (EHQ), a bastion of the old 'Coventry' establishment, was opposed to the con cept of a highly mechanized continuous plant, preferring the conventional batch processes, requiring huge factory areas and large numbers of people. Kearton demonstrated, using pilot units erected at a speed said by EHQ to be impossible, that the capital cost of the plant, and its operating costs, especially of labour, would be substantially lower than those of a conven tional plant. The Board supported him. The plant, at Mobile in Alabama, was built at a speed that contrasted sharply with the leisurely construction of another new Courtaulds factory in the U.K. Not surprisingly, it experienced teething troubles but once these were solved the novel design was vindicated and became the model for plants built over the next 30 years at Grimsby, Carrickfergus, Greenfield and Barrow in the U.K., and in Canada. Plant embodying the design was also sold to Russia, and to Sweden, Finland and Austria.
The manufacture of cellulose wood pulp, first contemplated by Courtaulds in 1908, and re-examined from time to time, was initiated in 1947. Growing demand from competing end uses for existing supplies, the volatility of prices, fears about security of supply and the knowledge that it might now be possible to manufacture a suitable pulp from the plentiful supplies of hard woods, all contributed to the decision. Kearton took part in the investiga tions and in 1951 the decision was made to form the South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation (SAICCOR). The early difficulties of the project -from first consideration in 1948 to first production in 1955 -were mirrored in the problems of manufacture and use. Here Kearton's contribution was crucial. He took charge of the project and drove the man agement to produce pulp with characteristics and consistency of quality that would enable it to be used by the group's viscose factories at a cost which showed a significant overall con tribution to total group profits. He drove equally hard to insist that the viscose managements found ways to maximize the use of the new pulp, thus enabling progressive expansions in South Africa to yield the benefits of scale. Initial production was modest, at 40 000 tonnes per annum, but by 1986 this had been increased in a series of steps to 450 000 tonnes per annum, SAICCOR becoming the leading world producer of pulp for viscose. Established technology was used for the initial installation, and successive expansions added more chem ical plants of the same type. However, the high cost of shipping sheet pulp to the group's fac tories in Europe, the U.S.A. and Canada provided the stimulus to develop an alternative form to reduce freight costs. Work at Coventry on a novel form of drying in the form of loose flock and the compaction of this into blocks of high density was successful. Not only did this give a significant saving in freight costs but it also eliminated the need for additional sheet formation and drying equipment -one of the most costly parts of a conventional pulp plant to install and operate. There were problems both in commissioning the new plant, and espe cially in modifying the input stages of the viscose factories. Kearton's single-minded deter mination brought success and a major cost advantage was secured. Ultimately the SAICCOR project was a huge success and contributed substantially to the profits. It is doubtful whether it would ever have done so, or indeed whether it would ever have become more than a minor producer, had Kearton not applied his talents of technical insight and managerial drive.
1952-1962
His growing influence and contribution were recognized by his appointment to the Board in March 1952. His span of involvement, already large, grew steadily. In 1957 he was made a Managing Director. By 1960 he was a director of 16 Group companies, was in charge of the Processing Division, the Synthetic Fibres Division, British Celanese, SAICCOR, the Usutu Pulp Company and the growing sales of fibres, packaging films, and complete factories to the countries of Eastern Europe. In 1961 he was appointed a Deputy Chairman.
It has been said that the defeat of the ICI bid in 1962 marked a turning point in the poli cies and management of the company. While this is to some extent true many of the changes were in fact the culmination of steps pursued throughout the previous decade, many of which were a consequence of changes in membership and structure of the Board. Most of the new directors came from a social and educational background markedly different from that of their predecessors: men of intellect, some with degrees in science and economics, most of whom had gained experience in urgent wartime tasks. These directors brought to the Board an objective outlook and an impatience with the management culture of previous times. Kearton epitomized this new outlook. His constant search for new ideas, for short cutting traditional hierarchical procedures and, above all, for action itself caused much friction; and his sometimes intemperate style exacerbated that friction especially among members of the Board. But for the younger generation of staff he brought a breath of fresh air and was an inspiration. He was undoubtedly ambitious and he was certainly impatient with those whom he saw as obstructing him. But he was driven too by a determination to build a company that was, on the merits of its performance, a world leader in its businesses.
His actions following the acquisition of British Celanese illustrate his approach. The idea of a merger with British Celanese had been examined by both companies, and put aside, first in 1937 and again in 1944 and 1947 . Prompted by the formation of the EEC and also by the declining profits of British Celanese talks reopened in early 1957 and quickly reached a con clusion resulting in a take-over in early June.
The consequences of this were wide ranging. At a stroke Courtaulds became the dominant producer in Britain not only of viscose but also of acetate; it gave access to two important new markets, for triacetate apparel yams and for tow for cigarette filter tips. The group acquired fabric and garment companies, in the U.K. and overseas, and a modest presence in retailing, all important steps in the moves towards vertical integration of its fibre and textile interests. It gained too the embryo business in nylon 6, based upon caprolactam, an important factor in the negotiations with ICI after the failed bid in 1962. And it became the owner of what had been the first oil cracking plant in the U.K., built by British Celanese in 1942 to produce acetone and acetic anhydride, and thus gained new technology for the manufacture of chemicals.
Kearton seized these new opportunities with relish. Not only did they give scope for cost cutting, by both rationalization and by economies of scale, but also for market penetration and product development. This last was of course helped by the new dominance of the market; but just as significant was a totally different marketing approach, based upon fashion, design and the ability to pioneer new developments using branded merchandise manufactured through the vertical chain. Kearton seized these new concepts with enthusiasm and urged their adoption in the viscose business -not without some resistance from the notinvented-here brigade, but with eventual success.
This also gave an impetus to the policy of diversification which progressed along the twin paths of acquisition and of in-house development. Within the research division work on new processes and products was stepped up. Work on new fibre forming polymers took time to yield results but four years after deciding to concentrate on acrylics a unique process had been devised and it was decided in 1955 to build a major pilot plant. Progress was such that before this pilot plant started production in 1957 plans had already been approved for a full-scale plant to be built at Grimsby. By the late 1950s the fibre, Courtelle, was an established com mercial success. By any yardstick this was a considerable achievement. Great credit goes to the research teams directed by Wilson; yet his intellectual brilliance and his capacity for rational objective thought were not coupled with an ability to take rapid decisions and to drive through obstacles. Kearton assumed the leadership of the whole project and by his efforts drove it to profitability by 1961. One can only speculate what more might have been achieved had these two men, who between then had brought about this success, been able to work har moniously together. They were fundamentally incompatible in outlook and behaviour.
In early 1957 the Board resolved that Kearton should be responsible for diversification through acquisition. A subsidiary, Group Developments Ltd (GDL), was set up with Kearton as Chairman. GDL examined a wide range of possibilities, seeking businesses offering prospects for growth. Within two years detailed reports had been made on a large number of companies spanning manufacturing, retailing and service industries. The first acquisition was in paint and this was followed by others in packaging and in plastics. Later a much larger paint company, Pinchin Johnson & Associates Ltd, was bought. These were the foundations of what is today one of the principal international businesses of Courtaulds. Although the activities of GDL continued for only a few years, and many of the prospects examined were not pursued, a great deal was learned about the wider industrial and commercial scene, and much experience gained in evaluating companies and in the process of acquisition.
While all this was going forward Kearton's appetite for new opportunities remained keen. Courtaulds had been selling to the then Soviet Union for some years through London agents. In August 1956 Kearton visited the U.S.S.R. for the first time. After a visit to a man-made fibre factory in Kiev plans for expansion of the Soviet fibre industry were outlined. Offers were invited for the supply Of machinery and of complete plants -a business in which Courtaulds had previously had no experience. Kearton reacted with enthusiasm and in spite of the serious reservations, verging on downright opposition by some colleagues, began negotiations. These were protracted, entailing quotations on more than 20 separate projects, but eventually led to six contracts for complete plants being secured; four by 1961, and two others in later years. Once embarked upon this path, Prinex (process industries export), won contracts elsewhere including in Poland, Yugoslavia and China.
Kearton soon recognized the paradox that even in the highly structured Soviet system individuals possessed of power and personality are more important than functionaries. He soon recognized too that all important decisions, even on apparently minor matters, were made at a high level. He decided that sales would be made only through one entity within Courtaulds, and that all policy and pricing decisions were to be referred to himself. He thus created the mirror image of a state trading organization. His known personal interest ensured that Courtaulds had access at all senior levels. The relationships that he established and the pattern by which the business was conducted persisted until the collapse of the former regime at the end of the 1980s.
It is doubtful whether Kearton himself foresaw the total contribution that this new busi ness would eventually yield but it is incontrovertible that without his vision and persistence none of it would have happened. There were many problems. Insufficient account was taken of the tortuous business methods of the client. The outcome of goodwill visits of Russians to U.K. factories surfaced, sometimes several years later, in the midst of negotiations in the form of tendentious reports. The harsh conditions for construction and operation were often not sufficiently appreciated. In the end all the contracts were successfully completed and commissioned, but only because of Kearton's mastery of detail and refusal to accept failure. Those who took part in their negotiation and execution went through a unique experience from which many benefited in their careers. The relationships that were established, the most notable being with Kostandov, an outstanding Minister of the Chemical Industry (later a Deputy Prime Minister) served Kearton and his successors for many years.
On 18 December 1961 the ICI bid for Courtaulds (made on 15 December) was made public. On 5 January 1962 Courtaulds recommended its rejection. It was the largest, and most bitterly fought, contested takeover battle that had ever taken place in Britain. It culmi nated on the 12 March 1962 with ICI obtaining 38% of Courtaulds' equity. The details of how this bid came about, how the battle was fought, and some of the consequences for cor porate behaviour in the U.K., have been described in full elsewhere, notably by D.C. Coleman. One consequence was that it brought into public prominence the man who was seen to be the leader of the opposition to the bid. While he was certainly not alone on the Board in opposing the bid, he was, because of his quick thinking, his dynamism, his confi dence and his ability to articulate in colourful language what the majority of his colleagues believed, the man of the hour.
1962-1975
The aftermath of the bid saw a reconstruction of the Board, with those who had emerged as the new, dynamic, management team in the ascendance, led by Kearton, and the departure of Hanbury-Williams and Wilson, whose credibility had been damaged by the course of events (whatever they were) preceding the bid. Within the next year five other directors went, and four new executives, and one non-executive, were appointed to the Board. Despite Kearton's achievements and his outstanding performance during the fight, he did not at the time command a majority to succeed Hanbury-Williams. As so often in the past there was an urge to find 'a distinguished outsider'. Sir Dallas Bernard, who had joined the Board in 1954 as a non-executive, was elected Chairman.
There was a speedy realization that the projections made in the course of the battle, especially those on profits, had to be met. Two new committees of the Board were created. Kearton was made Chairman of an Operations Executive of seven directors; he was also a member of a three man Policy Executive. He set about the task of increasing profits with his customary zeal. He promulgated a single minded focus on profits which became an obses sion. No part of the group, however well it was performing, was free from constant prodding for even greater profits. He bombarded management at all levels, vociferously and often, with a flood of telephone calls and of the gold-edged cards in his own hand (often indeci pherable) whose impact became legendary.
One preoccupation that taxed even Kearton's ingenuity and determination was how to cope with the situation resulting from the large ICI minority holding. In the short term an uneasy modus vivendi was achieved. This did nothing to relieve the need to find a formula for disengagement, a process that occupied much time of the members of both Boards. On 27 April 1964, some two years after the conclusion of the battle, it was announced that agree ment had been reached. ICI relinquished its holding in Courtaulds, the latter gave up its shareholding in British Nylon Spinners (BNS), and ICI agreed to pay Courtaulds £2 million per annum for five years. Kearton had played a key part in the negotiations; in October of that year he was elected Chairman.
While this was going on the further development of the business continued apace. Kearton was determined to use the foothold into nylon which came with British Celanese to enter that business on a significant scale. Production of Celon, nylon 6, was started in 1964. Internal capacity for its use was installed; the only way in which a significant increase in Celon pro duction could be consumed.
In the decade that followed, capacity for the production of existing fibres and yams was increased, research into improved types of these fibres was stepped up, and it was decided to embark on the production of polyester, of elastomerics, and also, for high technology indus trial applications, of carbon fibres.
This too was the period that saw rapid development of verticality. When the history of this period comes to be written it will be tempting, but misleading, to depict the process as the step by step implementation of a coherent policy. In fact the policy grew in importance as it was implemented and while some of the moves were planned others were opportunistic. But throughout it was the vision and determination of one man that drove it forward. On a paper given to the Cotton Board Conference in 1965 Kearton set out at some length his views on the industry. He was speaking shortly after some of the moves described and it is perhaps therefore not surprising that some of his statements contrast with his actions.
Among the first moves were those to safeguard the market for viscose staple fibre. Kearton proposed a so called Northern Plan, with the encouragement of the Board of Trade, to create a group comprising five of the largest companies in the Lancashire sector of the industry, to be owned by Courtaulds. It was a bold and imaginative concept and it very nearly succeeded. In the event one of the companies withdrew its agreement when it saw the valuations of the other companies.
It did, however, trigger rationalization and modernization of the industry. Some steps were made jointly with ICI; others, including the takeover of Lancashire Cotton Corporation, Fine Spinners and Doublers and two smaller companies, some 34% of the sector in total, by Courtaulds acting alone. Other moves took the company into weaving, into dyeing and finishing, into garment making, and also into wholesaling. Some of these were by means of acquisition and others, notably weaving, by the building of new greenfield factories. Mistakes were made. Many of the firms taken over were woefully short of good management, and although by this time the intensive post-war recruitment drive, heavily centred on the research division, had built up a strong core of staff there was too ready an assumption that scientists and technologists, competent in their own fields, could be transferred into the management of businesses which, although based upon technical processes, required other skills. Financial and commercial exper tise could not be grafted on overnight however numerate the person might be.
Vertical operation brought new problems. Much management time was spent seeking equitable formulae for transfer pricing. The protection afforded by verticality led to ineffi ciencies and profitability suffered. And although verticality accelerated the pace of new developments it could and did breed complacency. Nor was verticality a sufficient answer to low cost imports from developing countries. For these and other reasons the changes that were made in response to the changes in economic conditions in the late 1970 sincluded the dismantling of much of the vertical structure and eventually, in 1990, to the establishment of the textile business as a separate corporate entity.
Concurrently with the drive towards verticality in the textile business similar moves were in progress in the packaging and plastics areas and although never as large in sales or profits as the fibre-textile complex both became major parts of the group internationally. The first steps into paint have been described. The takeover of Pinchin Johnson, which took paint from a small diversification venture to a serious part of the business, and the growing confi dence in the conduct of that business, led to the acquisition in 1968 of the International Paint Company. This was accompanied by a furious row between the Company and the Take Over Panel during which Kearton castigated the City and some of its institutions. Within a few years these interests were consolidated as International Paints, which became a world leader in the marine, yacht and industrial protective coatings fields.
In the period following the ICI bid sales had been increased from £173 million to £1,134 million, and profits before tax from £18 million to £118 million. By any standards this was a notable achievment. While not attributable only to one man Kearton was the leader in both the formal sense, from 1964, and in practice over a longer period. His personal influence was felt throughout the Company. In addition to rapid formal financial reporting Kearton received information by means of weekly reports from general managers, letters to and from all and sundry, telephone calls to all levels of line management and throughout the service departments of the company, communications from customers and competitors, and reports from the economic and research departments. His appetite for information was insatiable. The coherent overview that this gave enabled him and his colleagues to steer operations on both a short term and a strategic basis.
His vision, drive and capacity were an inspiration. He pursued strategies that took Courtaulds from a medium size, technically innovative but poorly managed fibre company to a large, internationally competitive and profitable business in fibres, in forest products, in textiles, in paint, in plastics and in packaging. His management methods and style were less universally admired. His strictures on perceived shortcomings could be severe. Delivered harshly, they were often intensely personal and to withstand them required a robustness and resilience not possessed by all. His tendency to prolong the pressure resulted in several dam aged careers. He had a bleak outlook on management issues and frequently expressed his belief that softness at the top has a malign influence throughout the organization.
He retired from the Board at the conclusion of the Annual General Meeting on 23 July 1975. At the end of the Board meeting in June, without prior discussion, he announced that he had decided that it was time for him to go. He added that he would take no part in the selection of his successor. The Board chose Arthur Knight.
On 23 July, before the AGM at 12 noon, Kearton continued to transact business as normal. He wrote to a lady who had complained about the poor fencing surrounding the reservoir at one of the factories; as was normal practice, he asked a colleague to agree the draft. After the AGM the Board returned to the office for lunch where, for the first time in 11 years, he did not take the Chair. After lunch he moved to a small room at the remote end of the directors' corridor, which he used occasionally for some weeks.
The many changes in the economic environment and the different strategies developed by his successors brought about many changes to the group over the years. From time to time he wrote to, or telephoned, the Chairman. It was invariably to congratulate the Company on some event or some achievement; hardly ever to offer other comment.
Other appointments
Throughout his life Kearton undertook a variety of assignments, some of which were onerous, whereas others were truly part time. He made a full and unstinting contribution to them all.
His part-time appointments were numerous and widely spread and reflected either a facet of one of his special interests or were seen by him as a challenge to contribute to the public need. Although much in demand he accepted few non-executive Board appointments in the private sector; he became a Director of Hill Samuel 1970 to 1981, and was for a brief period in 1981 Chairman of the British Printing Corporation after it was acquired by Robert Maxwell. The style of the two men could hardly have been more different. In spite of Kearton's distaste for Maxwell's extravagant way of life he admired the latter's enterprise and his urge for change. It was one of Kearton's mistakes to believe that Maxwell was funda mentally honest in spite of his unacceptable corporate and personal behaviour.
Most of Kearton's appointments were in some way linked with public service. An early task was as a member of the Special Advisory Group of the British Transport Commission in 1960. The objectives set for the management of the railways, nationalized in 1948, were vague. No strategic aims were defined and no attempt seems to have been made to distin guish between the social needs of a public service and those activities that were essentially commercial. The growing muddle, exacerbated by successive enquiries, and the mounting losses, led Ernest Marples, the Minister of Transport in 1959, to appoint a special group to advise both himself and the British Transport Commission on organization and financial structure.
The Special Advisory Group was Chaired by Sir Ivan Stedeford, Chairman of Tube Investments, and its other members were Henry (later Lord) Benson, a Partner in Cooper Brothers, Richard (later Lord) Beeching, a Director of ICI, Kearton, and two civil servants. The Group, appointed in April 1960, reported in October. Its recommendations were confidential but undoubtedly formed the essence of the White Paper presented to Parliament in December 1960 that set out the changes in organization to enable the railways to be run as a business.
The character and experience of Beeching and Kearton were crucial in the speed and thor oughness of the enquiry, which concentrated on establishing the facts and probing deeply into management organization and practice. The dire situation that was revealed has been described elsewhere. It led directly to the total restructuring of the railways and their man agement in which Beeching played such a central role; and in spite of much criticism, much of it emotional and ill-informed, it saved the railways.
The Group's achievement in six months was remarkable. All its members held demanding appointments, and certainly Kearton's participation in the task made no inroads into the time he devoted to Courtaulds affairs.
Other appointments included Visitor, DSIR, 1955 DSIR, to 1961 DSIR, and 1963 DSIR, to 1968 Member, later T h e NUCLEAR in d u st r y : ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND SUPPLY Kearton's work on atomic energy during the war made him in great demand in the British post-war nuclear programme. His knowledge of uranium enrichment led Christopher (later Lord) Hinton, appointed to head the newly formed establishment at Risley which was charged with the production of fissile material 'for whatever purpose it might be required', to attempt to recruit him. In 1946 Hinton asked Kearton to join the Risley team as superinten dent designate of the proposed diffusion plant. Hinton did not offer him the job in charge of the whole project believing that to bring in someone who was not a professional engineer would strain the loyalty of his key engineers. Kearton, who had just agreed to join Courtaulds, declined. Perhaps if a firm offer for the larger job had been made earlier he might have accepted. He was again approached in 1949 to head the proposed R&D Department at Risley but Courtaulds said that 'he could not be spared'. In 1952, Hinton again tried to attract Kearton, this time as his potential successor. Hinton had with difficulty persuaded the Treasury to agree to the necessary salary, but was unable to get agreement to increase the pay of his two key men to avoid disrupting a notably successful team. He, there fore, dropped the proposal. In any case Kearton was not keen -he was by then enjoying his growing power in Courtaulds.
Nonetheless Kearton played an important part in the industry. He served on the Technical Committee, an advisory committee set up by Lord Portal in 1947, composed of eminent sci entists and engineers. He also served on a high powered Design Committee formed to advise on the design of the diffusion plant, and among many contributions was intimately involved in the selection of the pipework material -a vital decision.
His contributions to nuclear energy were organized in 1961 when he was elected F.R.S.; a distinction which gave him enormous pleasure and which he treasured throughout his life.
He continued his association for many years, and was indeed present in 1982 when the Capenhurst diffusion plant was finally shut down. He served as a member of the Fleck enquiries set up to investigate the 1957 Windscale Pile fire, the worst known nuclear acci dent at that time. He made important contributions across the whole gamut of nuclear issues -technical, organizational, safety, the structure of the power engineering industry (he held strong views about the need for a limited number of world-class players), and the future direction of policy. Many of these issues are still a matter of debate and his pleas for a unified policy and a national strategy are as relevant today as they ever were.
The Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC)
The formation of the IRC developed from the belief of the 1964 Wilson Government that to obtain the full impact of modem technology within British industry, intervention would be necessary. There was also a widespread view that British management was inadequate to bring about the industrial restructuring that was required to achieve international competitiveness. The belief that intervention was necessary was not confined to the politi cians. Although several government departments were examining ways of addressing these issues a businessman, B.R. Cant, then in the Powell Duffryn group, wrote a paper that analysed the industrial scene in Britain and called for national intervention. His paper led to him being seconded to the Ministry of Technology where he worked on what became the IRC -whose Board he joined on its formation. By the middle of 1965 the concept of the IRC was taking shape. There was much debate about its remit with some wanting it to be respon sible not only for promoting mergers to bring about international competitiveness but also for creating and controlling new public corporations.
When finally formed it had a more limited remit, set out in the White Paper of January 1966 presented to Parliament by George Brown, then Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Crucially the IRC was designed, and presented, as a pragmatic instrument of indus trial policy and not as a political tool. This message was reinforced by the choice of Kearton, renowned for his personal drive and his intolerance of bureaucratic interference, as Chairman and by the appointment of a Board composed largely of active and successful industrialists.
It was a very unusual public corporation which accomplished much with small resources. The staff never exceeded 30 in total, with about 10 executives at any one time, and a total of only 22 executives throughout its life. At the outset it was decided that the Managing Director (MD) should be full time and a merchant banker. Ronald (later Sir Ronald) Grierson was MD from 1966-67 and, after a gap of three months, Charles (later Sir Charles) Villiers was appointed and served until the Corporation was abolished in 1971. The executives were recruited mainly from the private sector, many with a financial background and with little or no industrial experience, with no formal contracts and on the understanding that they would be with the Corporation for about two years.
Kearton himself served from its formation in June 1966 (its formal existence by Act of Parliament took place in December 1966) to December 1968. Although Chairman of Courtaulds he made an enormous contribution to the IRC. His renowned appetite for paper, and his rapid ability to extract the essence of an issue, was complemented by his own direct involvement with the executive team.
The role of the IRC was wide ranging and loosely defined. In practice its first year saw little apparent action. The establishment of the Corporation, and especially the recruitment of executives, took time. So did the sifting of possible projects. The Board itself was pre occupied with working out its mission and how it should operate. In addition Grierson was at pains to play down the proactive interventionist role. He made it clear that he saw the IRC acting only with the cooperation of industry. Nevertheless much was in fact achieved. The first of a stream of outstandingly able executives were recruited. The groundwork for much of what was done later was completed. And the first project, participation in the refinancing of Rootes accompanying the investment by Chrysler, was completed (in spite of some unease on the Board which had wanted its first act to be a clear example of reorganization).
Its next act was concerned with a major merger -the acquisition of Elliott Automation by English Electric in June 1967. Three months later the IRC was involved in an even biggerand more significant -merger, the takeover of AEI by GEC. This was not only a large deal leading to the formation of a world size business, but one in which the IRC openly took sides. It backed GEC in spite of the opposition of the AEI Board to the deal. Grierson was opposed to this and resigned.
Thereupon Kearton took over as Chief Executive until Villiers was appointed in February 1968. The clear signal sent by its actions in the GEC-AEI takeover and the determination and drive of Kearton, prepared to face, or indeed to provoke, controversy, took the IRC into a new phase. The pace quickened and the projects in which it now became active spanned steel, textiles, instrumentation, paper, engineering and others; and the merger of British Motor Holdings and Leyland, in which Kearton was himself closely involved, took place in January 1968. During this period it was his normal practice to spend the first part of each morning (he was usually active from 5 a.m. or before) at the IRC before going on to Courtaulds at around 11 a.m.
Villiers who became MD in February 1968 maintained the impetus generated by Kearton. He carried forward projects initiated during the previous three months, and played a key part in many others including the formation of two nuclear engineering groups from consortia already involved in the industry.
Kearton left the IRC at the end of his stint in December 1968. It went on as actively as ever until in October 1970 the Heath Government announced the decision to abolish it. Its last deal was announced in April 1971. The initial remit of acting as a 'merger broker' was pursued throughout. But the Board had always seen that management was of prime impor tance and that in helping to bring about mergers it could and should insist upon strong and effective management. The experience of some of its less successful operations -British Leyland is an example -strengthened this conviction and using its power to bring about management change became a major part of its activity.
In its brief existence the IRC was involved in more than 50 mergers. A detailed account of these has been given by Hague and Wilkinson in a book that also analyses the methods of working and the consequences of the actions taken.
The question may be asked as to how so much was accomplished in such a short time. In spite of its political genesis it was not used as a political blunt instrument. From the outset Kearton and the Board were determined that its policy should be based on industrial and commercial logic, albeit with a national and international perspective. Its first MD bent over backwards to avoid unwelcome intervention. It did not dispose of huge funds; in fact it uti lized only some two thirds of its modest funding limit of £150 million.
What it set out to do went with the grain of the prevailing industrial climate. There was a widespread urge for industrial concentration. Many in industry and the City believed that the economies of scale and the commercial muscle which went with size were a prerequisite for international success. Its small size gave it agility and the ability to react instantly to opportu nities; the chain of decision was three people -the executive directly involved, the MD and the Chairman. They met daily. It recruited young executives possessed of ambition, ability and ideals. And it was led by a man of vision and determination who was utterly committed to the IRC's mission. It is not irrelevant to note that many who worked as IRC executives went on to become some of the most successful business leaders of their generation. John Gardiner, Graham Heame, Christopher Hogg and Alistair Morton are Chairmen of major companies; Geoffrey Owen became Editor of the Financial Times.
The British National Oil Corporation (BNOC)
On 21 July 1975, the day before he retired from Courtaulds, Kearton met Mr Tony Benn, then Secretary of State For Energy. They had known each other since 1964 and Kearton had come to admire Benn for his pragmatic approach to problems (an instance was Benn's prompt response in lifting import restrictions following the explosion at the NYPRO plant which at a stroke stopped supplies of caprolactam to Courtaulds' nylon plants). Within days Kearton became Chairman designate of BNOC.
At the time there were differences of view between Ministers as to the form and role of BNOC. Some, notably Edmund Dell and Harold Lever, were at pains to do nothing to offend the major oil companies -especially BP. They felt that the petroleum tax revenue from the North Sea was a sufficient share of the spoils. Benn, and others, were determined to find a way of giving BNOC real muscle. Kearton quickly immersed himself in the subject and soon decided that it would not be in the national interest for BNOC to have only a passive role in the North Sea, monitoring developments on behalf of the government. He detected that the oil companies did not really believe that the government could be so moderate in its demands under the participation agreements reached previously. Some expressed the fear that once the true wealth of the North Sea was appreciated the government would confiscate it all. He believed that the major oil companies could and should be persuaded to participate in BNOC. Negotiations were slow and difficult and continued to be hampered by divided views in gov ernment. The oil companies were opposed to the whole idea of BNOC with BP in particular refusing to negotiate. The more the talk dragged on the more disillusioned Kearton became, especially when at a meeting at Chequers the Prime Minister appeared to entertain BP's argument that until the government sold its holding, the most it could offer was help, staff secondment, and arms-length consultancy. Kearton found this astonishing and pointed out that if these arguments were accepted it would be 10 to 15 years before BNOC was properly established. He said that he would resign if this view prevailed; he had become totally con vinced that BNOC -should play a major part in the development of the North Sea fields.
Eventually negotiations were concluded giving BNOC participation rights and involvement in bidding for exploration licences. The oil companies continued to protest, claiming that BNOC held up the licensing process. Indeed, Kearton became Chief Executive as well as Chairman of the corporation, since the hostility of the industry made the post difficult to fill.
His period at BNOC -he resigned in November 1979 -was one of the most active and turbulent of his career. Without doubt he saw the task as a personal challenge, to which the attitude of the oil companies only added spice. He was also genuinely outraged by what he regarded as their cupidity over a national asset.
In 1979, its fourth year of operation, BNOC sold 342 million barrels of oil (including sale back and royalty oil), a turnover of £3,245 million, and made a pre-tax profit of £75 million. In the same year it was involved in the drilling of almost half the exploration wells on the U.K. continental shelf. At the end of the year the Corporation held participation agreements which gave it options on up to 51% of the petroleum produced on the U.K. continental shelf.
This, from a standing start, and against bitter opposition, was an almost unbelievable achievement. R.E. (later Sir Ronald) Utiger wrote in the Annual Report of BNOC in April 1980 'He brought to his task not only vast technical and commercial experience, but more importantly a determination and enthusiasm and drive which inspired all his colleagues to achieve things of which they did not know they were capable. I do not think that any other man could have created this Corporation in such a short time'. C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e U n iv e r s it y o f B ath
Kearton received an Honorary D.Sc. in 1966 on the occasion of the installation of the first Chancellor, Lord Hinton -a happy coincidence since the two men had been associated from the early years of the nuclear industry. In 1980 he was made Chancellor himself and became a notably active member of the University. Although he never abused his position by step ping over the non-executive line, he was always ready to give advice.
In conducting Council he stimulated lively debate. He did not hesitate to express his views especially if he felt that the University was being less than vigorous in its search for and use of resources. He warned frequently of the need to be as self sufficient as possible and main tain maximum independence. He greatly enjoyed presiding at Degree Congregations, missing not a single one up to 1991, and insisted in playing his full part in the proceedings, fashioning his address to suit the occasion and speaking without a note. He saw the occasion as one of unique celebration for the graduands and for their families. He also took part in many other university functions. The Annual Blues Night when the awards were made was a favourite for him and his wife Kay, and he much enjoyed the annual reunion of graduates at Convocation. The more spirited the occasion the more they both enjoyed it.
In addition to these official events he relished attending student functions of all kindsand such was his and Kay's enthusiasm that the student societies vied with each other in inviting them to dinners and other occasions. He was much in demand by the several engineers' societies and was always ready to speak both on topical issues and, especially, on the subjects close to his heart -the importance of education and scientific research, and of the vital contribution of the manufacturing industry to this country. He believed passionately in leadership and in making things happen. He saw it as part of his role as Chancellor to implant those beliefs in the minds of the leaders of the future. He was never happier then when mixing informally with young people.
He presided over the celebrations and the Charter Day service in Bath Abbey on 25 October 1991 marking the 25th anniversary of the granting of the University's Royal Charter. Professor Quayle, the Vice-Chancellor, wrote in the Bath Report of 3 July 1992 shortly after his death 'his address in the Bath Abbey was a fitting end to his own Chancellorship while, at the same time, an inspiring start to the next 25 years. The university has lost a most remarkable Chancellor and a friend'. Kearton was co-opted as a member of the influential Science and Technology Committee in 1985, 1986 and 1987 and appointed a member in the years 1987-91. He contributed par ticularly to the enquiries on Innovation in Manufacturing Industry (1991), the Science Budget (1991), Ship Design and Safety (1992), and U.K. Space Policy (1990) . He was also a member of the ad hoc Committee on Overseas Trade, chaired by Lord Aldington, the report of which in 1985 stirred up a good deal of controversy.
In 1991 Lord Jellicoe chaired an important enquiry to review the committee work of the House of Lords. Kearton took an active part in that enquiry and, in spite of his deteriorating health, regularly attended the meetings. Lord Jellicoe himself said how valuable his contribu tion was.
Kearton's participation in this wide ranging select committee work was characterized by his penetrating insight, his direct style of speech, which as another Peer has written, could 'verge on the picturesque', and his unfailing courtesy to witnesses. He continued to take a full part in the Committees of which he was a member, and to speak in the House, even when he was desperately ill. He was much loved and his death was seen as a tremendous loss.
Private life
This account of Kearton's business and professional career has made scant reference to his personal life. Yet his wife and family were everything to him. However important or urgent other issues their well-being and concerns were paramount. He rejoiced in their suc cesses and he shared their problems and disappointments. He was devoted to his wife, Kay, and took it for granted that she shared in the honours and rewards that his success brought to him. His family, and above all Kay, sustained and refreshed him; for all his ebullience he too could experience disappointment and frustration.
Although he worked long hours and was away from home a good deal Kay and he took every opportunity to be together; family commitments usually prevented Kay from accompanying him abroad but she frequently joined him as far as the airport. They both gained great pleasure from the social engagements associated with his many activities and in which his vitality was just as evident as in the business itself. Doubtless he saw this as part of his duty but it also appealed to his sense of fun.
However seriously he applied himself he never lost his mischievous sense of humour. An incident in South Africa recalls the lengths to which this would sometimes go. Following a SAICCOR Board meeting in the 1960s he became mildly exasperated with the dour behav iour of the senior staff who, as he put it, could talk about nothing but wood pulp. Supported by J.D. Kushke, Chairman of IDC and of SAICCOR, he instructed them to build a swimming pool in the nearby village of Umkomaas. Typically he took a hand in the design, incorpo rating a glass viewing wall.
His leisure interests were gardening, reading, driving (to be driven by him was exhila rating for those with strong nerves) and entertaining. Just as his business life was austere, so his private life was relaxed and convivial. He was a generous and joyful host and Kay and he enjoyed entertaining in their beautiful old house at Whitchurch.
A SUMMING UP
No summary can encompass the contribution made by Kearton in so many diverse fields. But his life was so eventful and at times turbulent that some comment on what, at the end of the day, drove him seems appropriate.
He was possessed of boundless energy, impatient, sometimes intolerant, always active, never able to resist a challenge whether it was The Times crossword, the establishment of BNOC, or growing the best tomatoes in his village. He had a staggering capacity for work. It will be evident that his management style was not to everyone's taste. Sir Alistair Morton, who worked with him at the IRC and became Chief Executive at BNOC, describes how their relationship began with a monumental row. For 24 years thereafter their friendship prospered on the basis of deep mutual respect. Many who worked for and with Kearton over the years had similar experience. In dealing with people he sought to stiffen resolve; to test reaction to pressure; and to convey the importance and urgency of the issue. He respected a robust response and as Morton has said he would often lift the person concerned with words of encouragement as well as of challenge.
The phrase 'inordinately ambitious' recurs throughout his life. But personal ambition was only part of it. He believed this country had a great future. He believed in social justice, but he had no time for the mere redistribution of wealth. He believed in the creation of wealth by enterprise, by effective management, and by applying the results of advancing technology. He had a deep conviction about the importance of manufacturing industry and for all his belief in individual enterprise he also believed that the country's total resources should in some way be used to match the national endeavour mounted by such countries as Japan and the U.S.A. He was, first and last, a patriot.
